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I Comments I
The 1998 ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work: Promoting Labor Law Reforms
Through the ILO as an Alternative to
Imposing Coercive Trade Sanctions
"The drive to forge the global market was led primarily from
the suites-the plush offices of banks and corporations, the
comfortable seminar rooms of the foreign policy community.
The new internationalism-the drive to make this economy
work for people, to secure basic worker and human rights,
environmental and consumer protections, sensible anti-trust and
financial regulation-is being driven from the streets."
John J. Sweeney, AFL-CIO President1
1. Overview
Since the conclusion in
World Trade Organization's
Trade (WTO/GATT), there
unions for "social clauses"
sanctions and fundamental,
1994 of the Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and
has been substantial pressure from
in trade agreements, linking trade
internationally-recognized workers'
1. Remarks by John J. Sweeney, New Internationalism Council on Foreign
Relations (visited Apr. 1, 1998) <http//www.aflcio.org/publ/speech98/spO4Ol.htm>.
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rights. 2 Led by the American Federation of Labor and Congress
of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO"), U.S. unions have
agitated for enforceable international labor standards and codes of
conduct as a check on the social consequences of economic
globalization.3 Union pressures for trade sanctions have signifi-
cantly influenced the U.S. congressional debate on trade legislation,
including NAFTA and "fast track" authority, as well as negotia-
tions in international trade forums.
4
On June 18, 1998, the Eighty-Sixth International Labor
Conference of the United Nations' International Labor Organiza-
tion ("ILO")5 adopted the ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work ("ILO Workers' Rights Declara-
tion").6 The ILO Workers' Rights Declaration, together with its
annex for follow-up procedures adopted by the ILO Governing
Body on November 19, 1998, 7 obligates the United States and the
ILO's other 173 member nations to adhere to four fundamental
principles of labor and employment law.8 Those principles, as set
forth in the Declaration, are embodied in the ILO's seven core
workers' rights Conventions:
* freedom of association and the effective recognition of
the right of collective bargaining [C. 87 and C. 98];
2. Report of the Committee on the Declaration of Principles, International
Labor Conference, 86th Sess., (visited June 1998) http://www.ilo.org./public/english-
/10ilc/ilc86/com-decl.htm>. Provisional Record of Proceedings, International Labor
Conference, Doc. 20A, 86th Sess., (visited June 1998) <http://www.ilo.org-
/public/english/10ilc/ilc86/com-deed.htm>.
3. Trade Unions Urge Negotiations to Mandate Core Standards in Investment
Agreement, 11 DAILY LAB. REP. (Jan. 16, 1998) (BNA) A-4.
4. Unions will Again Urge Trade Ministers to Create Labor Working Groups
at WTO, 70 DAILY LAB. REP. (Apr. 13, 1998) (BNA) A-3.
5. The International Labor Conference is the plenary body of the Interna-
tional Labor Organization. The ILO is the oldest specialized agency of the United
Nations. It was founded in 1919 under Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles.
Following the demise of the League of Nations it became part of the United
Nations system in 1946. See generally, ANTHONY ALCOCK, HISTORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION 18-37(1971). See also, Jay M. Vogelson,
International Labor Organization, Report of the ABA Section on International Law
and Practice, 30 INT'L L. 654-663 (1996).
6. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,
International Labor Conference, 86th Sess., (visited June 1998) <http://www.ilo.org-
/public/english/lOilc/ilc86/com-dxt.htm>.
7. ILO Adopts Action Program on Declaration Follow-Up, 224 DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) A-6 (Nov. 20, 1998).
8. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, supra
note 6, at para. 2(a)-(d).
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* the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory
labor [C. 29 and C. 105];
* the effective abolition of child labor [C. 138]; and
* the elimination of discrimination in respect of employ-
ment and occupation [C. 100 and C. 111].'
The failure of the United States to ratify all but one (C. 105)
of these core workers' rights Conventions has shielded the U.S.
Government, and thus American corporations, from most forms of
ILO supervision regarding labor relations and employment
practices within the United States, although not in ratifying host
countries where American corporations operate.1 ° Adoption of
the new Workers' Rights Declaration, which is mandated as a
condition of ILO membership, still does not subject the United
States to the same level of ILO supervision as countries which have
ratified Conventions." The ILO Conventions and the 1998 Decla-
ration apply to governments and the relevant supervisory or follow-
up mechanisms cannot be extended to companies. The Declaration
does, however, provide an increased level of international scrutiny
of domestic U.S. labor and employment practices.12 In this way,
the 1998 Declaration is intended to encourage governments to
adopt and/or enforce existing labor standards consistent with the
ILO standards referenced in the Declaration to which countries are
required to adhere. In addition, the Declaration offers ILO
technical cooperation and assistance to member governments, and
employers' and workers' organizations in promoting the ratification
and implementation of the core Conventions. (see para. 3 of ILO
Workers' Rights Declaration)
For multinational employers, the overriding importance of the
Declaration is its preemptive effect on emerging "social clauses" in
trade agreements. The Declaration provides: "the ILO is the
constitutionally mandated international organization and the
competent body to set and deal with international labour stan-
9. Id.
10. Vogelson, supra note 5 at 658.
11. The Declaration in paragraph 3 merely obligates ILO members to adhere
to the principles embodied in the fundamental Conventions, but does not go
beyond the present text of the ILO Constitution. Report of the Committee on the
Declaration of Principles, supra note 2 at para. 10; Provisional Record of Pro-
ceedings, supra note 2 (Remarks of Mr. Potter, Employer Vice Chair). That is, the
Declaration and its follow-up annex impose no new reporting or compliance
requirements on the United States other than those already required of all
members under the ILO Constitution. Id.
12. Id.
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dards."' 3 The Declaration continues: "it is urgent, in a situation
of growing economic interdependence, to reaffirm the immutable
nature of [these] fundamental principles and rights ... and to
promote their universal application."14
The Declaration's preemptive effect is supported by the
December 1996 WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore, which
recognized that the ILO is the competent body to address funda-
mental labor standards in a multilateral trading system. 5 The
United Nation's World Summit for Social Development (Copenha-
gen 1995) also expressed support for the preeminent role of the
ILO concerning internationally recognized core labor standards as
a means to address the possible social consequences of trade
liberalization.1
6
This Comment, in Parts II and III, considers the 1998 ILO
Workers' Rights Declaration in the context of existing international
and intergovernmental codes and trade mechanisms for supervising
global labor and workplace standards. It continues, in Part IV, to
examine two of the core ILO Conventions incorporated in the
Declaration., C. 87 and C. 98, and actual or potential conflicts with
U.S. law and practice. Part V analyzes the Declaration and its
follow-up annex. Finally, in Part VI, the Comment considers the
Declaration vis a vis the expectations of trade unions and employ-
ers.
The Comment concludes, in Part VII, that the 1998 ILO
Workers' Rights Declaration reestablishes the preeminence of the
ILO as the most competent international body for the promulga-
tion, supervision and promotion of international labor standards.
Adoption of the Declaration reduces pressures on other interna-
tional bodies, particularly trade organizations such as the WTO, to
adopt trade sanctions as the appropriate means of enhancing
workers' rights and improving working conditions. The Declaration
provides an important means for promoting workers' rights and
labor standards among U.S. trading partners around the world. At
the same time, the Declaration's follow-up mechanisms may expose
weaknesses in current U.S. labor laws and labor-management
13. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, supra
note 6 at Preamble.
14. Id.
15. See, 241 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-1 (Dec. 16, 1996). See also, Abraham
Katz, WTO and the Social Clause, J. CoM., Jan. 8,1997. Report of the Committee
on the Declaration of Principles, supra note 2 at par. 8.
16. Report of the Committee on the Declaration of Principles, supra, note 2 at
para. 17.
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practices. Consistent with the Declaration's promotional objectives,
the result may be additional pressures on Congress to reform U.S.
labor and employment statutes to conform to the principles of the
international standards enunciated in the Declaration.
II. International Supervision of U.S. Labor and Employment
Practices
A. Introduction
Unions in the United States face dual crises: (1) rapidly
declining union density as a percentage of the American private
sector workforce; 7 and (2) rapidly increasing economic globaliza-
tion which has further eroded union influence over U.S. and
foreign multinational companies.18
Traditional collective bargaining pressures have failed to stem
the flow of American corporate investments and jobs to more
attractive overseas markets.19 Union efforts in Congress have
failed to change U.S. labor laws to increase union influence over
such decisions.2" Several decades of experiments in coordinated
17. In 1997, union membership in the United States comprised 14.1 percent
of the total workforce (including public sector workers), but only 9.8 percent of
the private sector, nonagricultural workforce. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S.
Department of Labor reported in 21 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) D-13 (Feb. 2,
1998). Private sector union membership has declined steadily since 1950.
The decline in union density in the United States parallels union
membership decline in other industrialized countries. W.B. GOULD,
AGENDA FOR REFORM 16-17 (1993). ("The retreat of labor is
surely an international phenomenon," citing the decline over the last
decade in union density in Japan (from 32 to 25 percent), the
Netherlands (from 42 to 28 percent) and Britain (from beyond 50
percent to approximately 46 percent). Id. U.S. private sector union
membership is the lowest among industrialized countries except
France and Spain. Id. There is natural competition, therefore,
among foreign unions to increase employment levels of multination-
als in their countries as the basis for new union membership.
18. See, e.g., Global Integration Seen Focusing New Attention on Trans-
National Union Efforts, 210 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-9 (Oct. 30, 1998); W.B.
Gould, Multinational Corporations and Multinational Unions; Myths, Reality and
the Law, 10 INT'L L. 655 (1976); R.J. BARNET AND R.E. MULLER, GLOBAL
REACH: THE POWER OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1974).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., House Labor-Management Relations Subcommittee, Report on
Failure of Labor Law - A Betrayal of American Workers, 193 DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) (Oct. 4, 1984), reporting on Has Labor Law Failed? Joint Hearings before
the House Education and Labor Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations
and the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Manpower, to Assess
the Adequacy of Federal Labor Laws, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). See also,
1999]
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multinational collective bargaining have been frustrated by the
conflicting "self interests" of foreign, host country unions. Those
unions seek to promote U.S. multinational investments abroad as
a means of job creation, higher standards of living, and increased
union membership in host countries.21 Although the increasing
pace of economic globalization has encouraged transnational union
dialogue and, in some cases, collaboration, there is little evidence
that such cooperation has had a significant effect on labor and
employment policies."
B. International Labor Codes
International instruments which establish a worker's right to
form and join unions and bargain collectively are not a recent
phenomena. Prior to the promulgation of separate international
labor codes, worker's rights to organize were included among the
"human rights" which are basic to freedom of association as
defined in Article 23(4) of the United Nation's Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (1948).23 More recently, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),24 which the
United States ratified in 1992, and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 2' as yet unrat-
INDUSTRIAL UNION DEPT., AFL-CIO, WORKPLACE RIGHTS: DEMOCRACY ON
THE JOB 10 36 (Elmer Chatak, Richard L. Trumka & Joe Uehlein, eds., 1994)
21. Global Integration Seen Focusing New Attention on Trans-National Union
Efforts, 210 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-9 (Oct. 30, 1998). See, e.g., Three Rail
Unions in North America Form Alliance to Coordinate Strategies, 176 DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) B-1 (Sept. 11, 1998) (Coalition of railway unions representing 150,000
rail workers in the United States, Mexico, and Canada organized to coordinate
collective bargaining and strikes "that can meet with equal strength the large
multinational railroad corporations." Id.) Efforts have focused on coordinated
bargaining strategies and sharing of information to assist bargaining among unions
representing multinational corporations. Id. But as one labor commentator
observed, "strictly speaking, there is no such thing as international collective
bargaining. ERNST B. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 292 (1968).
22. Id.
23. Art. 23.4, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. <http://www.un.org-
/overview/rights.html>. Everyone has the right to form or join trade unions for the
protection of his interests.
24. Art. 22, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
<http://www.tufts.edu/fletcher/multi/texts /BH498.txt> For the U.N.'s summary of
ICCPR, see <http://www .hrweb.org/legal/undocs.htm#CPR-Prot>.
25. Art. 8, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESR). <http://www.tufts.edu/fletcher/multi /texts/BH497.txt> For the U.N.'s
summary of ICESCR, see <http:// www.hrweb.org/legal/undocs.htm#ESCR>.
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ified by the United States, incorporated workers' rights to form and
join unions as fundamental civil and economic rights.26
For workers and trade unions, however, such general hortatory
statements supporting worker's "human rights" to form and join
unions and bargain collectively are unenforceable.27 Set forth in
international instruments as non-self executing treaties, such rights
are not subject to private causes of action in U.S. courts.28 For
years, U.S. unions paid little attention to these international
instruments or to the more specific International Labor Code
promulgated by the ILO.29 Until recently, there was little union
agitation for the United States to ratify international labor
conventions since U.S. unions felt well served by the 1935 Wagner
Act ("National Labor Relations Act").3"
Following the 1947 and 1959 Taft-Hartley and Landrum -
Griffin Act amendments, which reduced labor's organizing and
bargaining clout, U.S. unions have been less satisfied with the
adequacy of domestic labor laws.31 As union concerns increased
over growing multinational investments abroad, American unions
promoted alternative methods of regulating the labor and employ-
ment practices of multinationals through two international labor
codes - the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment's 1976 Employment and Industrial Relations Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises ("OECD Guidelines"), 32 and the 1977
26. Id.
27. See, Remarks by John J. Sweeney, New Internationalism Council on
Foreign Relations (visited Apr. 1, 1998) <http//www.aflcio.org/publ/speech98-
/spO4Ol.htm>. See also, Law Linking Bailouts With Labor Records Is Ignored,
Congressional Group Charges, 235 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-2 (Dec. 4, 1997
(urging linkage with international financial institutions, including the World Bank,
IMF, Asian Development Bank); The Future of the World Trading System, address
by Renato Ruggiero, Director-General of the World Trade Organization to the
Institute for International Economics (visited Apr. 15, 1998) <http://www.wto.org-
/wto/speeches/bergen>.
28. Id.
29. ERNST B. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION STATE 234 (1964).
30. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM 201 (1993); Industrial
Union Dept., AFL-CIO, Workplace Rights: Democracy On The Job 8-9 (Elmer
Chatak, Richard L. Trumka & Joe Uehlein, eds., 1994).
31. Workplace Rights: Democracy On The Job, supra, note 30 at 10-11; Gould,
supra note 30; U.S. H.R. Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations and
Committee on Manpower and Housing, Joint Oversight Hearings, "Has U.S.
Labor Law Failed?" 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1984; "House-Labor-Management
Subcommittee Reports on Failure of Labor Law-A Betrayal of American
Workers," 193 DAILY LAB. REP. (Oct. 4, 1984).
32. See OECD Guidelines for Multinational Guidelines (visited Apr. 1, 1999)
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/cime/mnetext.htm#employment>
1999l
476 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:3
ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy ("ILO Tripartite Declaration").33
In the 1980's, following defeat of labor law reform legislation
in Congress, union pressures mounted for U.S. ratification of
international labor conventions with the surprising support of the
Reagan administration's Secretary of State George Schultz and the
conservative Republican Chairman of the Senate Labor and
Human Resources Committee, Orrin Hatch.34 At U.S. Senate
hearings on the ILO, AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland urged
U.S. ratification of C. 87 and C. 98, stating:
The argument that U.S. ratification of human rights conventions
would create new rights for employees which they do not now
have is harmful to the image of an America that has been in the
forefront in the promotion and defense of fundamental rights
of freedom of association.35
In recent years, as trade liberalization has flourished, unions
have responded with such measures as the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC, the "labor side
agreement" to the North American Free Trade Agreement).36 In
addition, there are at least 215 voluntary corporate codes of
conduct and social labeling programs promoted by labor and
33. See Multinational Enterprises: Tripartite Declration of Principles (visited
Apr. 1, 1999) <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/85multi/tridecl/index.htm>.
34. See Orrin G. Hatch, Ratify International Labor Conventions, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 10, 1985. See Statement of Secretary of State George P.
Schultz, Hearings on U.S. Relations with the ILO, U.S. Senate Committee on
Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (reprinted at 177 DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) E-1 (Sept. 12, 1985); see also, Statement of Secretary of Labor
William E. Brock, Hearings on U.S. Relations with the ILO, supra, reprinted at
177 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) E-3 (Sept. 12, 1985).
35. Statement of AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland, hearings on U.S.
Relations with the ILO, U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1985, reprinted at 177 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-6 (Sept. 12,
1985). The legal problem created by U.S. ratification of C.87 and C. 98, as dis-
cussed in this Comment, is that ratified conventions would have the force and
effect of treaty obligations superseding conflicting provisions of domestic U.S.
labor statutes. For that reason, at the 1985 U.S. Senate hearings Abraham Katz,
president of the U.S. Council for international Business testified that "it is not
feasible to ratify ILO conventions which contain legal requirements different from
U.S. law without having a detrimental effect on U.S. labor laws." Statement of
Abraham Katz, Hearings on U.S. Relations with the ILO, supra, reprinted at 177
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) E-6 (Sept. 12, 1985).
36. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), reprinted
at <http://www.sice.oas.org./trade/nafta/labor-cl.stm
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consumer organizations to address issues ranging from child labor
to occupational safety and health.
C. Emerging International Trade Sanctions
Of greater concern to the business community, the AFL-CIO
has pressured for new, enforceable labor rights and environmental
provisions, set forth in a broad range of voluntary guidelines,
principles, and codes.3" Unions have also sought to include
enforceable labor rights through the GATT/WTO, the International
Monetary Fund ("IMF"), and the OECD's proposed Multilateral
Agreement on Investment ("MAI").39
Since 1995, the MAI negotiations involving the United States
and the other twenty-nine OECD nations,4 ° have focused primari-
ly on the objectives of ensuring equal treatment of national and
foreign investment and protection of those investments against
expropriation.41 The AFL-CIO has insisted, however, that the
MAI must include effective sanctions, rather than "weak hortatory
language,' 42 for violations of internationally recognized labor
rights. The AFL-CIO also has demanded that the MAI must allow
governments to impose restrictions on foreign investors - i.e., giving
preference to domestic inputs, requiring domestic content and local
37. 224 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-6 (Nov. 20, 1998).
38. See Statement of the United States Council for International Business,
Position paper on Codes of Conduct, (Dec. 21,1998), and accompanying Press
release. See also John M. Kline, International Codes and Multinational Business:
Setting Guidelines for International Business Operations, 73-74 (1985).
The business community's greatest fear is that voluntary intergovern-
mental codes for MNCs will evolve into binding international labor
standards, or will stimulate new national law patterned on voluntary
international codes. This fear is hardly groundless since such a develop-
ment is the explicit desire and intention of both organized labor and
many developing countries. Id.
39. Sweeney, supra note 27. See also AFL-CIO Executive Council Statement
Trade and Deindustrialization (visited Feb. 18, 1999) <http://www.aflcio.org/publ-
/estatements/feb99/cstrade.htm>.
40. The OECD is an intergovernmental organization consisting of the
following 29 major industrialized countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom,
and United States.
41. See Amb, Kjell Lillerud, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises: Symposium on the MAI Cairo, Egypt (visited Oct. 20, 1997) <http:-
//www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/maillillerud.htm>.
42. Sweeney, supra note 27; see also, Trade Unions Urge Negotiations to Man-
date Core Standards in Investment Agreement, 11 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-4
(Jan. 16, 1998).
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hiring, or other domestic political and economic objectives to
preserve jobs or protect natural resources. 43
The recent adoption of the 1998 ILO Workers' Rights
Declaration is a response to these growing pressures for linkage of
workers' rights and world trade. It is appropriate, therefore, to
consider the new Declaration in the context of these existing and
other emerging international labor codes.
III. Examination of Selected International Codes
A. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
In 1976, the OECD issued "Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises" in the areas of: disclosure of information, competition,
financing, taxation, employment and industrial relations, and
science and technology.'
The OECD Employment and Industrial Guidelines, inter alia,
encourage multinational enterprises in each of the countries in
which they operate to:
1. respect the right of their employees to be represented by
trade unions and ... engage in constructive negotiations...
with a view to reaching agreements on employment conditions
3. provide to representatives of employees.., information
which enables them to obtain a true and fair view of the
performance of the entity or, where appropriate, the enterprise
as a whole...;
8. in the context of bona fide negotiations with representatives
of employees on conditions of employment, or while employees
are exercising a right to organise, not threaten to utilise a
capacity to transfer the whole or part of an operating unit from
the country concerned nor transfer employees from the
enterprises' component entities in other countries in order to
influence unfairly those negotiations or to hinder the exercise
of a right to organise ...
The issuance of the Employment and Industrial Relations
Guidelines "forced the OECD into the posture of a quasi-regulato-
ry agency" with "strong, third-party involvement in the forms of
active trade union initiatives and discussions between multinational
43. Id.
44. OECD Guidelines, supra note 32.
45. Id.
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firms and governments. 4 6 Each of the nine paragraphs in the
Employment and Industrial Relations Guidelines has been the
subject of OECD review and interpretation based on alleged
infractions reported by international trade union secretariats, such
as the International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF) and the
International Federation of Commercial, Clerical, Professional, and
Technical Employees (FIET).47 The union complaints are chan-
neled to the OECD through the Trade Union Advisory Committee
(TUAC), which has consultative status with the OECD.4 8 The
TUAC consists of national trade unions, such as the AFL-CIO in
the United States, the Deutsche Gewerkschafts-bund (DGB) in
Germany, and the Trade Union Congress (TUC) in the United
Kingdom.49
The "cases" of alleged infractions of the Employment and
Industrial Relations Guidelines are referred to the OECD's
Committee on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises (CIIME) for review."0 Often the "cases" are reviewed
with reference to the practices of individual enterprises and are
designed to "illustrate the types of problems which in the experi-
ence of the trade unions, the implementation of the Guidelines
involves. "51
Although the OECD lacks authority to impose sanctions or
order remedial measures against offending parties, publicity
surrounding review of the "voluntary" guidelines constitute a form
of "enforced international regulation of multinationals., 52 As one
commentator noted, "soft law" can have "hard" consequences for
multinational corporations.53 Several early cases demonstrate the
legal and public relations problems posed by the Guidelines for the
multinational enterprises in the sensitive areas of union organizing
and collective bargaining.
Several cases which arose under the OECD Guidelines go
beyond the rquirements of the U.S. or the host country's labor
46. DUNCAN C. CAMPBELL & RICHARD L. ROWAN, MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISES AND THE OECD INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS GUIDELINES, 6-7 (1983).
47. Id. at 7.
48. Id. at 4.
49. Id. at 5.
50. Id. at 2.
51. CAMPBELL, supra note 46, at 7.
52. Id.
53. Kline, supra note 38, at 49 (quoting JOHN ROBINSON, MULTINATIONALS
AND POLITICAL CONTROL, 111 (1983). Robinson defined "soft law" as
"politically-agreed behavior which cannot be directly legally enforced but cannot
either be legitimately infringed." Id.
1999]
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laws. In 1977, for example, TUAC submitted a case to the
OECD's CIIME initiated by the International Metalworkers'
Federation.54 The case alleged that U.S.-owned Black & Decker's
refusal to grant recognition of two British unions - the General and
Municipal Workers' Union and the Amalgamated Union of
Engineering Workers - at the company's Spennymoor (U.K.) Plant
violated paragraph 1 of the OECD.55 The company's defense was
that the employees in question had previously voted against
representation by the unions in a secret ballot, which under U.S.
and British labor laws would have exonerated the company.56
Similarly, in 1977 two British white-collar unions submitted a
charge through TUAC to the OECD's CIIME. The charge
alleged that the U.S.- owned Citibank-Citicorp violated paragraph
1 of the Guidelines by the distribution of anti-union literature
opposing the union's organizing campaign at its U.K. subsidiary.58
Although the labor relations practices of the two companies proved
not to be violations of either American or British labor laws,
CIME commented that paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Guidelines
encourage that "management adopt a positive approach toward the
activities of trade unions ... and, in particular, an open attitude
towards organizational activities."59  To one commentator, C-
IIME's admonition suggested that under the Guidelines employers
should be required to take a "neutral" approach on matters of
unionization,6" although that is contrary to U.K. and U.S. labor
relations statutes. U.S. labor law permits employer "free speech"
opposing unionization through non-threatening, non-coercive
communications with employees.6
In another early case, during the 1979 review of the Guide-
lines, CIME considered the transfer of employees from Hertz
Corporation's subsidiaries in the U.K., Italy, and France to
maintain business operations during a strike at Hertz's Danish
facilities.62 CIIME held that the company's practice of attempting
to operate during a strike using the company's employees from
54. CAMPBELL, supra note 46, at 39.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 46.
58. Id.
59. CAMPBELL, supra note 46, at 50.
60. Id.
61. 29 U.S.C. §158(c).
62. CAMPBELL, supra note 46, at 183.
PROMOTING LABOR LAW REFORMS
other locations did not violate either Danish or U.S. labor laws. 63
Nor was it at that time specifically mentioned as a prohibited
practice in the Guidelines. CIME concluded, however, that the
practice was not in conformity with the "spirit" of paragraph 8 of
the Guidelines and that "enterprises should definitely avoid
recourse to such practices in the future. ' Thereafter, the OECD
amended paragraph 8 to include language that enterprises should
not "transfer employees from the enterprises' component entities
in other countries" in order to influence a labor dispute.65
B. ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multina-
tional Enterprises and Social Policy
The ILO's Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy ("ILO Tripartite
Declaration") was promulgated in 1997 as a voluntary code of
conduct to guide governments, employers' and workers' organiza-
tions, and multinational enterprises in the fields of employment,
training, conditions of work and life, and industrial relations.'
Under the follow-up procedures of the ILO Tripartite Declaration,
complaints concerning a multinational corporation's noncompliance
with the code's provision should first be raised with the corporation
itself and the host government.67 If the dispute is not resolved at
the first level, the host government or a labor union may invoke
review by the ILO's tripartite Subcommittee on Multinational
Enterprises," assuming the "case" satisfies the jurisdictionalthreshold, in the same way that complaints concerning noncompli-
63. Id. at 188.
64. Id. at 187.
65. Id.
66. ILO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 33.
67. Kline, supra note 38, at 64.
68. Unlike the OECD procedure for submitting cases, the tripartite structure
of the ILO permits direct participation by unions as well as employers in the
Subcommittee on Multinational Enterprises. Kline, supra note 38, at 64. Thus,
although the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the
International Organization of Employers (1OE) are the ILO's counterparts to the
OECD's consultative TUAC and the Business and Industry Advisory Committee
(BIAC), it is not necessary that submissions be referred by consultative bodies in
the ILO system. National unions, such as the AFL-CIO, have standing in the
ILO's Subcommittee of Multinational Enterprises to initiate and participate in the
consideration of matters concerning interpretation of the Tripartite Declaration of
Principles. Id.
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ance with OECD Employment and Industrial Relations Guidelines
are referred to the OECD's CIIME.6 9
As with CIIME, the ILO's Subcommittee on Multinational
Enterprises lacks the power to impose sanctions or order remedial
measures for noncompliance with the organization's voluntary
code. It does, however, issue a public report designed to give effect
to the principles of the code and, while not "ruling" on individual
cases, interpreting it in the context of the activities of multinational
corporations.7"
C. NAFTA's Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC)
Since its adoption, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) has authorized the receipt of complaints against the
United States, Canada, and Mexico involving the labor and
employment practices of U.S. corporations.71 Submissions are
lodged in the National Administration Office (NAO) of the
appropriate host country pursuant to the North American Agree-
ment on Labor Cooperation ("NAALC" or "Labor Side Agree-
ment").72 As of December 21, 1998, twenty submissions had been
filed. Eleven were filed with the U.S. NAO involving allegations
against Mexico. Two were filed involving Canada. Five were filed
with the Mexican NAO involving allegations against the United
States. And two submissions were filed with the Canadian NAO,
one raising allegations against Mexico and one against the United
States.73 Several of the submissions involved U.S. companies, or
their subsidiaries operating in Mexico's export processing ("maquil-
adora") industry, alleging violations of occupational safety and
health,7 4 gender discrimination,75 and various other unfair labor
69. Vogelson, supra note 5.
70. Id.
71. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), <http://www.sice.oas.org/trade-
/nafta/labor-cl.Stm>
72. Id. at Part 3, Section C, Articles 15-16 <http:// www.sice .oas.org/trade-
/nafta/labor-cl.Stm#artl5>
73. National Administrative Office, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Status of Submissions
Under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation(NAAL C), Sept. 18,
1998; 244 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-10 (Dec. 21, 1998).
74. U.S. NAO Submission No. 9702 (filed Oct. 30, 1997; alleging safety and
health violations at the Han Young maquiladora plant in Tijuana Mexico); Mexico
NAO Submission No. 9801 (filed Apr. 13, 1998; alleging safety and health
violations at Solec, Inc. in Carson, California); Mexico NAO Submission No. 9802
(filed May 27, 1998; alleging safety and health violations for migrant workers em-
ployed in the apple industry in the State of Washington).
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practices relating to union organizing. 6 The most recent submis-
sion to the U.S. NAO involves a complaint filed by the Internation-
al Brotherhood of Teamsters against the Canadian province of
Quebec regarding union organizing at a McDonald's restaurant.77
1. US. NAO Submission 9703-Among recent actions before
the U.S. NAO, Submission No. 9703 was submitted on December
15, 1997 by a number of American and Canadian unions, and over
30 U.S. and Mexican labor, human rights and non-governmental
organizations. 78 The submission alleged violations of freedom of
association and occupational safety and health at the ITAPSA
export processing plant in Ciudad de los Reyes, Mexico. ITAPSA
is a subsidiary of the U.S. corporation Echlin, Inc., based in
Bradford, CT, that produces and distributes automotive parts in the
United States, Canada and Mexico.
79
The U.S. NAO accepted the submission on January 30, 1998,
and completed its review on March 23, 1998 following a public
hearing.8" The NAO's public report on July 31, 1998 concluded
that ITAPSA's management and the incumbent union (Confeder-
acion de Trabajadores Mexicanos, or "CTM"), engaged in unlawful
acts of anti-union discrimination against the petitioning Union of
Metal, Sheet, Iron, and Allied Workers (Sindicato de Trabajadores
de la Industria Metalia, Accro, Hierro, Conexos Similares, or
"STIMAHCS") under Mexican labor laws. 81
75. U.S. NAO Submission No. 9701 (filed May 16, 1997; alleging pregnancy-
based discrimination in Mexico's maquiladora industry by denying employment
and terminating pregnant women).
76. U.S. NAO Submission No. 940001 and 940002 (filed Feb. 14, 1994; alleging
violations of workers' rights to organize by the Mexican subsidiaries of Honeywell
Corp. and General Electric Corporation); U.S. NAO Submission No. 940003 (filed
Aug. 16, 1994; alleging violations of freedom of association and the right to
organize by the Mexican subsidiary of Sony Corporation); U.S. NAO Submission
No. 9602 (filed Oct. 11, 1996; alleging violations of workers' rights to organize a
Mexican maquiladora facility in Sonora, Mexico owned by Maxi-Switch, S.A. de
C.V.).
77. 244 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-1 (Dec. 21, 1998).
78. U.S. NAO Submission No. 9703. The unions filing the submission were the
United Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and
Textile Employers (UNITE), the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers
(UE), the United Auto Workers (UAW), the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW),
the United Paperworkers International Union (UPIU), and the United Steel-
workers of America (USWA). Pub. Rep. of Review NAO Submission No. 9703,
U.S. National Administrative Office, U.S. Dept. of Labor (July, 31, 1998) at 2.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 69.
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The NAO's findings established threats of retaliation and acts
of intimidation against supporters of STIMAHCS, including
surveillance, imposition of increased workloads, retaliatory
discharges, and physical attacks by persons associated with the
established union at the plant in the presence of company offi-
cials."2 The findings also included election misconduct which: (1)
excluded a number of STIMAHCS supporters from voting in the
union representation election; (2) obligated voters to state their
union preference in the presence of company officials and CTM
representatives rather than voting through a secret ballot; (3)
allowed non-employees to vote; and (4) manipulated the timing and
conduct of the election.83 The election misconduct included
postponing the election without informing STIMAHCS, then
videotaping workers who showed up to vote, and rescheduling the
election following threats of reprisals. Workers were forced to vote
in the intimidating presence of armed "thugs" patrolling the factory
grounds.'
The U.S. NAO's public report recommended ministerial level
consultations regarding the denial of freedom of association and
union organizing protections among Mexican workers at Echlin's
ITAPSA plant.85 The same issues were raised before the Canadi-
an NAO, which conducted public hearings on September 14 and
November 5, 1998.86
2. Mexican NAO Submission 9501 -Among the original cases
under NAFTA's Agreement on Labor Cooperation, the Mexican
Telephone Workers Union challenged the closure of a subsidiary
of the Sprint Corporation in San Francisco shortly before a
scheduled union representation election.87 Submission 9501 was
filed with the Mexican NAO on February 9, 1995, at the same time
the Communications Workers of America ("CWA") filed an unfair
labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") in the United States.88 On May 31, 1995, the public
report of the Mexican NAO condemned the plant closure, and
recommended ministerial level consultations regarding plant
82. Id.
83. U.S. NAO Submission No. 9703 at 69.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Status of Submissions Under the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation(NAALC), supra note 73, at 6.
88. Id.
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closings timed to avoid union organizing efforts.89 A public
hearing was conducted in San Francisco, and a study was completed
and released on the rights of workers to organize in the United
States, Canada, and Mexico.90
Responding to the CWA's unfair labor practice charge, the
NLRB on December 27, 1996 ordered Sprint to reinstate the
dismissed workers and awarded back pay.91 On November 25,
1997, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed the NLRB's findings and ruled that the company closed
the facility for lawful and legitimate financial reasons.
9 2
IV. Selected ILO Conventions
A. Convention 87 - Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organize
The ILO's Convention 87 (C. 87), promulgated in 1948,
establishes several fundamental rights governing union organizing.
Among those rights, Article 2 provides that "workers and employ-
ers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish
and, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to join
organizations of their own choosing without previous authoriza-
tion. ,9
3
Article 3 provides for the non-interference of governmental
authorities in the internal affairs of labor organizations.9 4 The
specific language prohibits "any interference" which would
"restrict ... or impede" the ability of workers' organizations "to
elect their representatives in full freedom, to organize their
administration and activities and to formulate their program-
mes."
95
Article 4 provides that labor organizations "shall not be liable
to be dissolved or suspended by administrative authority.' '96
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. La Connexion Familiar & Sprint Corp., 322 NLRB 774 (1996).
92. LCF, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F. 3d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
93. Art. 2, C. 87 (1948), in ILO Conventions and Recommendations Adopted
by the International Labor Conference, 663, (Geneva: International Labor Office,
1966).
94. Art. 3, C. 87, supra note 93, at 664.
95. Id.
96. Art. 4, C. 87, supra note 93, at 664.
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Article 11, entitled "Protection of the Right to Organize,"
provides that:
Each member of the International Labour Organization for
which this Convention is in force undertakes to take all
necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that workers and
employers may exercise freely the right to organize.'
Thus, Article 11 broadly "lays down an obligation for the State
to take measures to prevent any interference with such rights
without qualification that is, interference by individuals, by
organizations or by public authorities.
98
1. Conflicts Between C 87 and US. Labor Law-The broad
standards of C. 87 (prohibiting any employer interference without
qualification, in workers' efforts to form or join unions), and their
interpretation by the ILO's supervisory authorities, cannot be
reconciled with the substantially more precise legal requirements of
U.S. labor law and practice in both the private and public sec-
tors.99 For example, Article 11 is incompatible with Section 8(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). 10 0 Section 8(c)
97. Art. 11, C. 87, supra note 93, at 664.
98. EDWARD E. POTTER, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, THE RIGHT TO ORGA-
NIZE AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 43 (1984), quoting International Labor
Conference, record of Proceedings, 32nd Sess. 306, 470 (1949).
99. Id. at 5-7, 44-45. For a more detailed analysis of the conflicts between
U.S. labor law and ILO Conventions 87 and 98, and arguments as to why the
United States should not ratify those conventions, see Potter's Treatise, supra note
98 at 43. Among the other conflicts identified by Potter and discussed in the text
of this Comment, one of the most fundamental principles of U.S. labor law is the
concept of "exclusive recognition" - i.e., the union receiving the majority of votes
as the "exclusive representative" of all employees in the bargaining unit. If the
union fails to achieve majority status, under U.S. labor law the minority has no
representational rights. While, as Potter notes, the concept of an exclusive
bargaining representative is generally compatible with C.87, the ILO's Committee
of experts has ruled contrary to U.S. labor law that "[m]inority organizations
should be allowed to function and at least have the right to make representations
on behalf of their members and to represent them in the case of individual
grievances." 1983 Report of the Committee of Experts, para. 141, cited in Potter,
supra at 15. The AFL-CIO has included a similar position as one of its domestic
labor law "reform" goals in Congress. See, e.g., Right to be Represented by a Non-
Majority Union in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, Workplace Rights:
Democracy on the Job 30 (Elmer Chatak, Richard L. Trumka & Joe Uehlein, eds.
1994) ("explicit organizational rights for unions without majority status (should)
include the right to pay dues (through dues checkoff) ... to have the union
present grievances to management, and the right to negotiate with management
on behalf of its members." Id.
100. 29 U.S.C. §158 (c). See also, S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24
(1947), reprinted at Vol. 1 Legislative History of the Labor-Management Relations
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grants employers "free speech" rights to communicate their
opposition to unions openly among employees if such views,
arguments or opinions contain "no threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit." '' Employers in the United States may
require employees to attend the employers' anti-union speeches on
company property during working time within 24-hours of the
election - "captive audience speeches" - while denying union
organizers the same forum.1 2 In addition, employers are permit-
ted under the NLRA to restrict union access to employees
throughout the preelection campaign by excluding non-employee
union organizers from company premises,"3 and prohibiting
employees from soliciting union support during working time"°
or distributing union literature in work areas."°5 The NLRA also
restricts the ability of unions to engage in organizational picketing
for recognition [Section 8(b)(7)],"° and "hot cargo" agreements
[Section 8(e)], °7 and secondary boycotts.08
Another important conflict between C. 87 and U.S. labor law
is the NLRA's exclusion of certain categories of workers - e.g.,
supervisors, agricultural workers, public employees, and indepen-
dent contractors."°  While such workers still have the right to
freedom of association under the first and fourteenth amendments
Act, 1947 (GPO: 1985), 407, 429-430; 13 NLRB Ann. Rep. 49-50 (1948), reprinted
at Vol. II, Annual Reports of the National Labor Relations Board, Annual
Reports 1943-1949 (GPO:1985). Cf. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 395 U.S. 575,
617 (1969) (The NLRA's "free speech" doctrine includes the right of employers
to address employees in mandatory meetings held on company time without
affording equal time to the union or to prounion employees. See e.g., Livingston
Shirt Corp., 107 NLRB 400 (1953); Peerless Plywood Co., 107 NLRB 427 (1953).
101. 29 U.S.C. §158 (c).
102. Livingston Shirt Co., 107 NLRB 400, 409 (1953) ("an employer does not
commit an unfair labor practice if he makes a preelction speech on company time
and company premises to his employees and denies the union's request for an
opportunity to reply."). See NLRB v. Steelworkers (Nutone Inc.), 357 U.S. 357
(1958). Under the NLRB's "24-hour rule," however both unions and employers
are prohibited from delivering captive audience speeches to massed groups of
employees within 24-hours of an election. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 NLRB 427
(1953).
103. Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992); NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
104. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798, 803, fn 10 (1945);
Beverly Enterprises-Hawaii (Hale Nani), 326 NLRB No. 37 (1998).
105. NLRB v. Steelworkers (Nutone, Inc.), 357 (1958); Our Way Inc., 268
NLRB 394 (1983).
106. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(7).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
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to the U.S. Constitution, employers are not required to recognize
them or accord them collective bargaining rights under the
NLRA.11 ° So, too, plant guards are not permitted under the
NLRA to belong to the same bargaining unit as other represented
employees."1 These provisions clearly conflict with Article 2 of
C. 87 which provides that "workers and employers, without
distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and ... to
join organizations of their own choosing., 112 (emphasis added)
Article 2 also may conflict with U.S. labor laws concerning
"contingent workers," such as those temporary employees who are
supplied under contract by an agency or labor broker. Under the
National Labor Relation Board's Greenhoot doctrine, 3 such
employees may not be placed in the same bargaining unit with
other regular employees, regardless of the employees' wishes,
absent the consent of both the "joint employers" - i.e., the
temporary staffing agency and the contracting employer. 4
Other articles in C. 87 relating to the internal administration
of union affairs are incompatible with provisions of U.S. law in the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure ("Landrum-
Griffin") Act.1 5 For example, C. 87 is designed to prevent
government actions from interfering with the institutional rights of
labor organizations to organize their administration and activi-
ties."' The Landrum-Griffin Act, however, is concerned with the
110. 29 U.S.C. § 258(b)(4). Before the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act amendments,
"secondary boycotts were among the most effective economic weapons in labor's
arsenal" by permitting a union to apply economic pressure against a "secondary"
or neutral in the dispute between the union and the primary employer. The 1947
amendments prohibited many forms of secondary boycotts [Section 8(b)(4)] and
added two remedial enforcement provisions: Section 10(1), which requires the
NLRB to seek federal court injunctions to stop secondary boycotts, and Section
303, which allows the injured party to sue in federal court for damages.29 U.S.C.
§ 164 (a). Section 14(a) of the National Labor Relations Act provides, for
example, "Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor
from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer
subject to this Act shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as
supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law either national or local,
relating to collective bargaining." ABA The Developing Labor Law, supra note
32 at 1211,1215-16. The AFL-CIO's legislative goals (see notes 161 and 162)
include eliminating all Taft-Hartley restrictions on secondary boycotts. Note 162
supra, at 135.
111. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3).
112. Art. 2, C. 87, supra note 93.
113. Greenhoot, Inc., 205 NLRB 250 (1973).
114. Id.
115. 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.
116. Potter, supra note 98 at 5.
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protection of individual union members from the improper conduct
of labor organizations with regard to union membership, union
election conduct, union funds, and other internal union affairs."n
For example, while the Convention prohibits government interfer-
ence in the activities of trade unions, the Act authorizes the federal
government to regulate, and thus interfere with, internal union
conduct in such areas as the election of union officers for national,
international, and local unions.1 Landrum-Griffin also establish-
es the maximum terms of union office and methods of election
[Section 401 (a), (b) & (d)]," 9 the nomination of candidates and
voting rights of union members [Section 401 (e)], 2° the financing
of union elections and support for individual candidates [Section
401 (h) & (i)], 121 and procedures to enforce those regulations
[Section 402].122
The fundamental differences between C. 87 and U.S. labor law
were highlighted by a 1959 ILO Fact-Finding Mission to the United
States which investigated American compliance with the standards
of "freedom of association" embodied in C. 87 and the ILO
Constitution. 123 The Mission noted the "deterioration of the legal
right to freedom of association" as a result of restrictions on trade
unions under the Taft-Hartley (1947) and Landrum-Griffin Act
(1959) amendments.1 24  It further commented critically on the
difficulties unions face in organizing certain business and geograph-
ical sectors in the United States. The Mission's report concluded:
"[T]he acceptance of trade unionism [in the United States] is
more in the nature of resignation to the fact that unions exist
than of positive approval. Such persons are willing to accept
the unions and to deal with them because they have succeeded
117. 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.
118. Id.
119. 29 U.S.C. § 401 (a),(b) & (d).
120. 29 U.S.C. § 401 (e).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 401 (h) & (i).
122. 29 U.S.C. § 402.
123. Haas, supra note 22, at 236-238. At the same time, the ILO sent a Fact-
Finding Mission to the Soviet Union. The ILO reported much more favorably on
the rights of labor organizations in the Soviet Union, as compared with the United
States, concerning freedom of association under C. 87. International Labor Office,
The Trade Union Situation in the U.S.S.R. (Geneva, 1960) (cited in Haas, at 232
n.57).
124. International Labor Office, The Trade Union Situation in the United States
(Geneva, 1960) at 9 (quoted in Haas, supra note 22 at 237). In particular, the
Report was very critical of employer practices, permitted under U.S. labor laws,
to influence representation elections.
1999]
490 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:3
in establishing themselves; but they would not go so far as to
say that trade unions are desirable or necessary.""
As one commentator observed, under the ILO's definition
"freedom of association" was not firmly established under U.S.
labor law since "it is not enough merely to tolerate your partner
and to negotiate with him in a context of interest confrontation;
you must actually love him too!" '126
2. ILO Committee on Freedom of Association-Asstated
earlier, since the United States has not ratified Convention 87, it is
not subject to the full supervisory machinery of the ILO with
regard to the precise legal obligations of that Convention. Thus,
there is no body of ILO case law or established legal precedent
involving U.S. law and practice from the ILO's Committee of
Experts, or from the ILO's Conference Committee on the Applica-
tion of [Ratified] Conventions and Recommendations ("CACR").
It is difficult, therefore, to state conclusively that non-conforming
aspects of U.S. labor law would in fact be determined to be in
noncompliance with the conventions if ratified by the United
States.
Appropriate guidance may be derived, however, not only from
the critical comments of the 1959 Report of the ILO Fact-Finding
Mission to the United States, discussed above, but also from the
more recent decisions of the ILO's Committee on Freedom of
Association regarding U.S. labor-management relations. While the
United States has not ratified the underlying Conventions, it is
subject to limited scrutiny by the Committee on Freedom of
Association ("CFA") which reports to the ILO's Governing Body
regarding complaints against any ILO member for violations of the
right to organize and bargain collectively.12 7
Recent charges brought before the CFA against the U.S.
government include President Reagan's firing of the PATCO
strikers in 1981.128 Although the President's actions were upheld
in the U.S. federal courts, 129 the CFA concluded that "the appli-
cation of excessively severe sanctions against public servants on
account of their participation in a strike cannot be conducive to the
125. Haas, supra note 21, at 237.
126. Id. at 238.
127. C. 87 <http://www.tufts.edu/fletcher/multi/texts/BH219.txt>
128. Freedom of Association Committee, Case No. 1974. Para. 372 (Nov. 1981).
129. PA TCO, 7 F.L.R.A. No. 16 (1981), Professional Air Traffic Controllers v.
FLRA, 685 F. 2d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
PROMOTING LABOR LAW REFORMS
development of harmonious industrial relations". 3 ° Therefore,
the CFA encouraged the government to reinstate the strikers,
reduce their fines, and renew bargaining with the union.'
In 1991, an AFL-CIO complaint 32 against the U.S. govern-
ment raised the legitimacy of U.S. law concerning the permanent
replacement of economic strikers - the Mackay doctrine'33 - which
was under assault in Congress.1 4  The CFA concluded that the
basic right to strike, which is essential to freedom of association, "is
not really guaranteed when a worker who exercises it legally runs
the risk of seeing his or her job taken up permanently by another
worker, just as legally".'35 Therefore hiring permanent replace-
ments is "a risk of derogation from the right to strike, which may
affect the free exercise of trade union rights."' 36
B. Convention 98 - Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The ILO's Convention 98 (C. 98), promulgated in 1949,
establishes the obligation of governments to encourage voluntary
negotiation of collective bargaining agreements in the private and
public sectors. Ratification of C. 98 would be incompatible with
the more precise provisions of U.S. labor laws.
Particularly troubling for employers would be the Convention's
expansion of a union's right to strike and to engage in other
economic actions designed to support the union's bargaining
position.' 7 Although the National Labor Relations Act and the
130. CFA Case No. 1974, supra note 128.
131. Id.
132. Freedom of Association Committee, case No. 1543 (May 1991).
133. NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
134. See H.R. 5/S. 55, 102nd Cong. 1st sess. (1991) (amending the National
Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act to make it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to hire permanent replacements for striking employees).
See also, Daniel V. Yager, Loading the Scales: Is the Balance Between the Right to
Strike and the Right to Operate in Need of reform? (Employment Policy
Foundation 1993).
135. Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, Case No. 1543, para.
92 (May 1991)
136. Id.
137. Potter, supra note 98, at 27-33. Although neither C. 87 nor C. 98
specifically addresses the right to strike, the ILO and its Committee of Experts
link that right to the Conventions as "one of the essential means available to all
workers and their organizations for the promotion and protection of their
economic and social interests." 1983 Report of the ILO Committee of Experts,
200, cited in Potter, supra at 27.
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Railway Labor Act protects the right to strike,138 such protections
are not without limits.
Section 8(b) of the NLRA, for example, sets forth several
restrictions on a union's right to exert economic pressure in support
of collective bargaining demands. A strike in support of "feather-
bedding"'139 is illegal under Section 8(b)(6). 4 ' Jurisdictional
strikes141 and other job actions in violation of "no strike"
clauses142 in collective bargaining agreements are unprotected
under the NLRA.143 The ability of employers to lock out their
employees to support bargaining positions" or, as stated above,
an employer's right to hire permanent replacement workers in
place of economic strikers'45 also seem to be incompatible with
C. 98.
The scope of bargaining -particularly, the important distinction
in the NLRA between "mandatory" and "permissive" subjects of
bargaining 146-is blurred under C. 98.147 Legal criteria and
138. 29 U.S.C. § 163 ("Nothing in this Act [National Labor Relations Act],
except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to
interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike or to affect the
limitations or qualifications on that right.").
139. "Featherbedding" is the practice of causing or attempting to cause an
employer to pay for services not performed. American Newspaper Publishers
Assn. v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 117 (1953).
140. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6)
141. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D); Plumbers & Pipefitters local 195 (Gulf Oil
Corp.), 275 NLRB 484 (1985); Operating Eng'rs Local 825 (Building Contractors
Assn. of NJ), 118 NLRB 978 (1957).
142. Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970);
Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
143. Other examples of "unprotected"and "prohibited" strikes include: "sit-
down" or "sit-in" strikes, NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240
(1939); "partial" or "intermittent" strikes, Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 107 NLRB 1547
(1954); and strikes in pursuit of illegal objectives proscribed by the National Labor
Relations Act or other statutes.
144. NLRB v. Brown Food Stores, 380 U.S. 278 (1965); American Ship Building
Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); Central Illinois Public Service Company, 326
NLRB No. 80 (1998).
145. NLRB v. Mackay Radio and Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
146. The NLRA provides in Section 8(d) a requirement to "confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 29
U.S.C. §158(d). The U.S. Supreme Court has developed the distinction between
those mandatory subjects of bargaining and other "permissive" subjects. See,
NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). The importance of the
distinction is that a party may insist to impasse on mandatory subjects, and strike
or unilaterally implement contract terms. Insistence on bargaining to include
permissive subjects of bargaining on which there is no statutory duty to confer to
include "closed shop" provisions and "hot cargo" clauses in violation of Section
8(e).
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factual interpretations of "good faith" bargaining consistent with
established National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") precedents
under Sections 8(b)(3) and 8(a)(5) 14 8 also would be at risk under
C. 98. So, too, NLRB standards for the adequacy of information
required of employers to support bargaining may be incompatible
with C. 98.149
One of the endemic problems under the administration of U.S.
labor laws is lengthy delays as a result of the NLRB and judicial
processes in the scheduling and final certification of union elections
and in remedying unfair labor practices.15 ° The ILO Supervisory
bodies, including the Committee on Freedom of Association, have
stressed repeatedly that such delays infringe on freedom of
association and collective bargaining rights.151  In the U.S.,
lengthy delays in bargaining, especially for initial contracts
following union certification, may result in the failure of the parties
to ever come to an agreement.15  This, too, may present a
147. See Potter, supra note 98 at 58.
148. 29 U.S.C. §158 (b)(3) &(b)(4).
149. The NLRA's requirement that the parties bargain in "good faith" obligates
employers to furnish relevant information to union representatives necessary to the
proper discharge of their duties as bargaining agents. NLRB v. Truitt Manufactur-
ing Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). A similar duty to furnish information is owed by
unions. Printing & Graphic Communications Local 13 (Oakland Press Co.), 233
NLRB 994 (1977), affid 598 F.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The relevance, necessity,
and timing of particular information for bargaining has been the subject of
extensive litigation and controversy before the NLRB and federal courts. See e.g.,
PATRICK HARDIN, ED., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, 3D ED. at 650-684(1992).
150. Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO, Workplace Rights: Democracy on the
Job 12 (Elmer Chatak, Richard L. Trumka & Joe Uehlein, eds., 1994); Gould,
supra note 31, at 159. ("the past decade has seen an enormous increase in the
time it takes to decide unfair labor practice cases. The median ... was 300 days
as compared with 133 days ... in 1980 ... For representation cases ... medians
ranged from 190 days to 256 days - also considerably in excess of the medians
established during the 1970s." Id.). Christopher D. Cameron, How the 'Language
of the Law' Limited the American Labor Movement, 25 U.C. DAVIS L.R. No. 4
(Summer 1992) (finding that election delays contribute to union defeats).
151. See Potter, supra, note 98, at 52. See e.g., 256th Report of the (ILO)
Committee on Freedom of Association, Case No. 1437 (BASF), para. 214 et seq.,
May 1988 (urging "speedy" U.S. legal procedures to resolve a labor dispute
involving BASF plant in Geismer, LA); 262 Report of the (ILO) Committee on
Freedom of Association, Case No. 1467 (Enoxy Coal), para. 203 et seq., March
1989 (criticizing "excessive" delays and length of appeals procedures under U.S.
labor laws).
152. U.S. Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations Fact
Finding Report, 73-74 (May 1994) (In the late 1950s, unions failed to secure a first
contract 14 percent of the time, but in the 1980s the percentage increased to
between 20 to 37 percent. The Commission reported that over one-third of newly
certified unions are unable to produce a contract.)
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potential conflict under C. 98, because even where the NLRB
determines that the employer has failed to bargain in good faith,
and that such delays are intended to frustrate bargaining, the usual
remedy is an NLRB order to continue bargaining.153
C. The Challenge of International Labor Standards for Domestic
Labor Law Reform
Each of the potential conflicts discussed above between ILO
Conventions 87 and 98 and domestic U.S. labor law are areas in
which the AFL-CIO has proposed labor "reform" legislation in
Congress. For instance, during the Ninety-Fifth Congress (1977-
1978), labor law reform legislation passed the U.S. House of
Representatives but was narrowly defeated in the Senate on an
extended filibuster. 54  That legislation, H.R. 8410/S. 2467,'55
contained proposed amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act which provided, inter alia, the following: expedited union
representation elections;156 limited judicial review of NLRB
certifications of election results;.57 and "equal access" rules giving
non-employee union organizers the right to campaign for employee
support on company property;5 s and "make whole" remedies for
delays in collective bargaining on initial contracts where employers
refuse to bargain in good faith.'59
More recently, in the 103rd Congress (1993-1994) labor law
"reform" legislation prohibiting employers from hiring permanent
replacements for economic strikers passed the U.S. House of
Representatives but was defeated by a Senate filibuster."6 Other
U.S. labor law changes advocated by the AFL-CIO include those
recommended to the U.S. Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations ("Dunlop Commission") in 1994,161 and
153. U.S. Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Report
and Recommendations, 21-22 (Dec. 1994) (As an alternative remedy, the
Commission recommended first contract arbitration and extending the "certifi-
cation year" in which the union's majority status is presumed).
154. H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1977. See reprint on Thomas, <http:-
//thomas.loc.gov./cgi.bin/bdqueri>
155. Sec. 5, H.R. 8410.
156. Id.
157. Sec. 3, H.R. 8410.
158. Sec. 8, H.R. 8410.
159. Sec. 3, H.R. 8410.
160. H.R. 5 - S. 55, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). See <http://thomas.loc.gov.-
/cgi.bin/bdqueri>.
161. U.S. Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations Report
and Recommendations, supra note 153 at 15-24.
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in an accompanying white paper "Workplace Rights: Democracy on
the Job" (1994) prepared by the AFL-CIO's Industrial Union
Department.'62 Among those proposed labor law reforms are
areas that are identified in this Comment as potential conflicts with
the ILO principles in the new Declaration. Those include:
* repealing Section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations
Act;' 63
* permitting unlimited access for non-employee union
organizers to outdoor employer property, such as parking
lots, and to workplace entrances and exits;"
* providing opportunities for the union to address employees
on company property at specified times; 65
* requiring automatic union recognition without a represen-
tation election where a majority of employees have signed
union authorization cards expressing a desire to be
represented (i.e., card check certification);"6
* requiring the NLRB to direct union elections within five
days of the petition for election;167
* removing all current exclusions for employee coverage
under the National Labor Relations Act ( i.e., agricultural
and domestic workers, supervisors, independent contrac-
tors, plant guards, and government contractors treated as
public employees);"6 and
* prohibiting employers from hiring permanent replacements
for economic strikers;69 and requiring binding interest
arbitration of initial collective bargaining agreements
where the parties have failed to reach agreement within six
months from the union's certification or when the parties
agree that they are at impasse. 7 '
V. 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work
In the context of existing voluntary codes of conduct (see Parts
II and III supra), and the unratified ILO Conventions discussed
162. INDUSTRIAL UNION DEPT., AFL-CIO Workplace Rights: Democracy on
the Job (eds. Chatak, Trumka & Uehlein) 1994.
163. Id. at 21.
164. Id. at 22.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 19.
167. INDUSTRIAL UNION DEPT. supra note 162 at 27.
168. Id. at 30.
169. Id. at 12.
170. Id. at 23.
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above (see Part IV supra), the United States tripartite delegation
to the ILO supported adoption of the new 1998 Workers' Rights
Declaration. The "social partners" sought the new Declaration for
very different reasons. The AFL-CIO wanted another, perhaps
more effective, international supervisory mechanism to monitor and
regulate corporate behavior in the global market.'71 Employers,
led by the United States Council for International Business
("USCIB"), wanted to reduce pressures for linking trade sanctions
and workers' rights.'72 See discussion in Part VI infra.
The only opposition to the 1998 Declaration was from a
number of developing countries, led by Mexico, Pakistan, Egypt,
and India. They feared that it would be used for protectionism.
7 3
In particular, they protested the Declaration's lack of a "safeguard
clause" that would bind developed countries from unilaterally or
collectively revoking trade preferences, or imposing trade sanctions
based on negative findings under the Declaration.'74
The Declaration obligates all ILO member nations, without
regard for their record of ratification of the ILO's core workers'
rights Conventions, to adhere to the fundamental principals
embodied in those Conventions. The Declaration obligates the
United States and, therefore, U.S. employers to conform to the
labor relations principles of ILO Conventions 87 and 98, discussed
above in Part IV, as well as the ILO's core Conventions on
abolition of forced labor (C. 29 and C. 105), child labor (C. 138),
and employment discrimination (C. 100 and C. 111).' 7
The ILO also adopted a follow-up mechanism to implement
the Declaration and promote the principles established as funda-
mental rights at work. The follow-up requires the ILO to publish
annual reviews of countries, such as the United States, which have
not yet ratified the relevant core ILO Conventions. The schedule
of annual reviews is: 2000 - freedom of association (C. 87 and C.
98); 2001 - forced labor (C. 29 and C. 105); 2002 - employment
discrimination (C. 100 and C. 111); and 2003 - child labor (C.
138).176 Interpretation of those Conventions' substantive require-
ments, and assessment of the extent of compliance by non-ratifying
171. 128 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) C-1 (July 6, 1998).
172. Id.
173. Id. at C-4.
174. Id.
175. Id. at C-2.
176. ILO Adopts Action Program on Declaration Follow-Up, 224 DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) A-6 (Nov. 20, 1998).
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ILO member nations, shall be undertaken by the ILO's existing
supervisory bodies.177
As legislative history, six criteria to define and limit the
parameters of the new Declaration were carefully enumerated
during the plenary session of the International Labor Conference
by the U.S. Employer Delegate Edward Potter, who served as the
Employer Vice Chair on the Declaration's negotiating commit-
tee.178 Those criteria are:
(1) "the Declaration establishes no new legal obligations on
ILO members,but reflects policy obligations which Mem-
bers incur by virtue of their membership of [sic] the
Organization." (emphasis added)
(2) "the Declaration's follow-up does not go beyond the
present text of the ILO Constitution. The follow-up
procedure is based on the constitutional provisions in force
and does not impose new reporting and compliance
obligations on member States over and above those
covered by the Constitution. In addition ... there is no
duplication or double jeopardy as a result of the follow-up
procedures. [i.e., countries that have ratified the relevant
ILO conventions will not be subject to 'double scrutiny'
under the Declaration]." (emphasis added)
(3) "the Declaration does not impose on member States the
detailed [reporting] obligations of conventions that they
have not freely ratified and does not impose on countries
that have not ratified the fundamental conventions [such
as the United States] the supervisory mechanisms that
apply to ratified conventions. The principles and rights of
the Declaration therefore only encompass the essence, that
is, the goals, objectives and aims of the fundamental
Conventions ... the test is whether there is a pervasive
failure of policy to meet the goals, policies and objectives
of the fundamental Conventions. This is something very
different from meeting the detailed legal obligations that
come with ratification."
(4) "the application of the principles of the Declaration is not
concerned with technical legal matters or matters of
detail."
177. Id.
178. Provisional Record of Proceedings, International Labor Conference, Doc.
20A, 86th Sess., June 1998 (remarks of Mr. Potter, Employers Vice Chair)
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english /10ilc/ilc/ilc86/com-decl.htm>.
1999]
498 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:3
(5) "the Declaration does not lead to setting up new com-
plaints-based [supervisory] bodies like the Committee on
Freedom of Association."
(6) "there is no link with questions of international trade and
follow-up methods are limited to the ILO. ' 179
While each of the criteria above is an important restraint on
the use of the Declaration in the context of the ILO, the most
important for U.S. employer interests is the understanding that
there is "no linkage" with trade agreements and that promotional
follow-up mechanisms are confined to the ILO. During the
drafting of the Declaration employers successfully removed
language that would have encouraged the World Bank, Internation-
al Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization to support
the ILO's efforts to promote ratification and implementation of the
fundamental conventions.18 °
The Declaration also contains language - apparently too weak
and ambiguous to satisfy developing nations - that neither the
Declaration nor its follow-up could be invoked for protectionist
trade purposes or used to put into question the comparative
advantage of any country.181 Even including anti-protectionist
language, however, was obnoxious to the ILO's Workers' Group as
reflected by the remarks of the U.K.'s Worker Delegate who
served as the Workers' Vice-Chair on the Declaration's negotiating
committee:
The Workers' Group is quite clear that to ask to belong to a
trade union and for it to bargain on your behalf is not protec-
tionism; to seek an end to child labour is not protectionism; to
wish to eradicate discrimination in the workplace is not
protectionism; to call for an end to the slavery of forced labour
is not protectionism; but to deny those rights to workers in
the name of comparative advantage - that is truly protection-
ism.1
82
So, too, employers were careful to ensure that the new
Declaration would not subject non-ratifying countries to the same
179. Id.
180. 128 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) C-1 (July 6, 1998).
181. ILO Declaration on.Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, Interna-
tional Labor Conference, 86th Sess., (last modified June 1998.) <http://www.ilo-
.org/public/english/10ilc/ilc86/com-decl.htm>.
182. Provisional Record of Proceedings, International Labor Conference, Doc.
20A, 86th Sess., June 1998 (remarks of Mr. Brett, Worker Vice Chair) <http:-
//www.ilo.org/public/english /10ilc/ilc86/com-decl.htm>.
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degree of ILO supervision as countries which have ratified ILO
Conventions, or to establish another complaints-based supervisory
body like the Committee on Freedom of Association." 3
VI. Will the 1998 ILO Declaration of Workers' Rights Meet the
Expectations of the U.S. Social Partners
For U.S. employers, support for adoption of the 1998 ILO
Workers' Rights Declaration was a trade off. The choice was
between continued pressures in world trade forums to link workers'
rights with trade through the "social clause" in trade agreements,
or the creation of another international code to monitor and
regulate labor and employment practices."84 The Declaration had
to be a credible and meaningful alternative to the social clause, but
not an enforceable set of new legal requirements governing labor
and employment practices beyond those set forth in national
legislation. Specifically, adoption of the new Declaration could not
have the legal effect of ratification of ILO Conventions, supersed-
ing existing U.S. labor laws and forcing the United States, as a
treaty obligation, to change conflicting domestic legal require-
ments. 85 For U.S. unions, support for adoption of the 1998 ILO
Workers' Rights Declaration was also a trade off. Although the
AFL-CIO has announced that it will continue to lobby for "social
183. Remarks of Mr. Potter, supra note 178.
184. Among other emerging codes are the following:
The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) text for a
"Basic Code of Conduct governing Labour Practices" adopted at the 111th
meeting of its Executive Board in December 1997.
See ICFTU Dept. of Employment and Int'l Lab. Stnds. "ICFFU/ITS Basic
Code of Labour Practice," <http://www.icftu.org/english/tncs/tncscode98.html>.
Also, the Code established by the U.S.-based NGO, the "Council on Economic
Priorities" through its Standards and Accreditation Agency Advisory Board, which
is an attempt to develop a single international standard for labor and human
rights. The Code includes provisions for independent monitoring.
Luc Demaret, "Can Multinationals Buy Good Conduct?" ICFTU Online
(visited Mar. 2, 1998) <http://www.icftu.org/english/pr/eprol05l-980225-Id.html>.
One of the earliest corporate codes of conduct was A Statement of Princi-
ples for U.S. Corporations Operating In South Africa (Sullivan Principles)
created in 1977 by Rev. Leon H. Sullivan to "promote racial equality in
employment practices, . . . promote programs improving the living
conditions and quality of life for the non-white population, and to be a
major contributing factor in the end of apartheid." Jill Murray,
Corporate Codes of Conduct and Labour Standards, ILO Bureau for
Workers' Activities, (visited Jan. 21, 1998) <http:// www. Ilo.org/public-
/english/230actra /publ/codes.htm>.
185. See Potter, supra note 98, at 71-89 (Procedural and Substantive Consider-
ations to ratification of ILO Conventions).
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clauses" in trade forums,186 it must realize that the new ILO
Declaration will be used to reduce those pressures. For the AFL-
CIO, therefore, adoption of the new Declaration must advance the
goal of promoting basic, internationally recognized workers' rights
in ways that are "central to the global trading and investment
regimes. ,187
A. Can Promotional Standards Be Enforceable?
Under the 1998 ILO Workers' Rights Declaration, the ILO
still lacks authority to impose legal or equitable remedies against
employers or governments for infringement of the Declaration's
fundamental principles and core Conventions. Under the Declara-
tion's follow-up annex, however, it will now be possible for unions
to direct world attention to unfair labor practices and employment
policies in non-ratifying ILO member nations, such as the United
States, through published annual reviews.'88 The reviews will
concern labor and employment practices in the United States, not
simply the practices of U.S. multinationals in ratifying host
countries.18 9
Of course, international notoriety gained through the published
reports of a U.N. agency could also be used in union domestic and
international "corporate campaigns," shareholder actions, consumer
boycotts, and communications with investors and financial institu-
tions.19° The reports could be used to portray the image of
''rogue employers," "international outlaws," violating the most
basic standards of workers' and human rights. The reports also
could be cited as a non-binding, yet persuasive documents before
domestic governmental agencies and courts. Such notoriety also
could be used to advance labor law "reform" legislation in the U.S.
Congress to conform U.S. labor laws with basic international
standards, or to promote ratification of ILO Conventions in the
U.S. Senate. 191 Thus, although not legally enforceable, the 1998
186. U.S. Delegates to ILO Conferences Have High Expectations for New
Declaration, 128 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), C-1 (July 6,1998).
187. Id.
188. See note 176 supra.
189. See note 177 supra.
190. See generally, CHARLES R. PERRY, UNION CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS
(1987).
191. See, e.g., Steelworkers Aim to Purge Industry's Global Outlaw, WASH.
TIMES (Feb. 20, 1992); Peter T. Kilborn, Union Shows How to Fight in West
Virginia, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 1992); David Corn, Workers United, A Town
Divided, NATION (Feb. 17, 1992); David Corn, The Search for Marc Rich, NATION
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Workers' Rights Declaration will be an important union mechanism
for promoting labor standards. It has been noted that "unions
generally favor binding agreements that place MNCs under tighter
government regulation, thereby expanding union leverage at the
national level and creating new labor rights regarding consultation
and bargaining at the international level." '192 Where the interna-
tional agreement is neither binding nor legally enforceable,
experience with other international codes demonstrates that unions
still use the agreement as a "lever" to influence the conduct of
employers or to influence the adoption or interpretation of national
legislation. 193 In that practical fashion, the promotional standards
become, in effect, "enforceable. '" 194
As a recent Chair of the ABA's Section of International Law
and Practice noted:
The ILO supervisory system relies on the power of
persistent persuasion and the mobilization of shame against
governments that fail to live up to the obligations they have
voluntarily undertaken. 95
B. "Is This the Code to End All Codes?"
The coercive threat of the "social clause" in trade agreements,
as well as campaigns by various constituencies for new corporate
codes and social labeling,196 has driven multinational employers
to seek a preemptive, uniform set of international labor and
employment standards - a "code to end all codes." In its press
release on the adoption of the 1998 Declaration, the USCIB hailed
the Declaration as a "major breakthrough" which "position(s) the
ILO apparatus as a credible alternative to the 'social clause-i.e.,
the use of trade sanctions to enforce labor standards.,
197
It remains unclear, however, whether the 1998 ILO Workers'
Rights Declaration will replace or merely supplement other
emerging methods of international supervision of labor and
(Feb. 24, 1992); How the USW Hit Marc Rich Where it Hurts, Business Week (May
11, 1992); Steelworkers Wage Corporate Campaign At Ravenswood with Aid From
AFL-CIO, 76 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-9 (Apr. 20, 1992).
192. Kline, supra note 38, at 73.
193. Id. at 76-83.
194. Id.
195. Vogelson, supra note 5, at 660.
196. See supra note 184.
197. USCIB Applauds ILO's Breakthrough in Campaign to Respect Workers'
Rights, USCIB Press Release (June 19, 1998) (the remarks were attributed to
Abraham Katz, president of the United States Council for International Business).
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employment practices. Some officials, including U.S. Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY), have stated that the new ILO
Declaration will assist in passage of "fast-track" authority,198
which was tabled in the 105th Congress (1998) because of concerns
for the lack of enforceable workers' and environmental rights
provisions.199 The same concerns have been injected in negotia-
tions for the Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA") 200 and
the OECD's Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI"). 20 1
Further compounding the uncertainty, President Clinton has
called repeatedly for linkage of trade with labor and employment
standards. 2 2 The AFL-CIO has made it clear that it will continue
to lobby for labor standards provisions at the WTO and in U.S.
trade policy.23 AFL-CIO President John Sweeney pronounced
that basic, internationally - recognized human rights standards also
should be incorporated in "IMF conditionality, World Bank loans,
OPIC and Ex-IM Bank activities, and A.I.D. programs.,
20 4
Indeed, reported remarks by the U.S. Government representa-
tive expressed the view during negotiation of the Declaration that
its adoption did not "impinge on the ability of the U.S. to condition
the extension of trade benefits on labor standards, or other related
198. 241 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-1 (Dec. 16, 1996).
199. Id.
200. 209 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) B-1 (Oct. 29, 1998), Negotiations on the
FTAA have centered on the participation of "civil society" in future trade negotia-
tions. A Government Committee on Civil Society has been formed input from
labor unions, environmental organizations and consumer activists on linkage of
core internationally recognized labor standards with the free trade agreement.
201. See supra note 39.
202. Trade Agenda Outlines New U.S. Effort on Trade Labor Link, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE (Mar. 12, 1999) (U.S. Government will continue to work on building
support in WTO for labor work program. "We will also continue to press our
trade negotiating partners to observe core labor standards ... we will continue to
work bilaterally through selective application of our duty preference programs, to
encourage the adoption and implementation of internationally recognized worker
rights." Id.) 97 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) B-2 (May 20, 1998 (President's Address
to WTO Stressing the importance of the "labor dimension" of trade liberalization).
Clinton Administration Committed to Labor/Employment Link in WTO, 150 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) C-4 (Aug. 5, 1998) (Speaking at the American Bar Association's
Annual Meeting, representatives of the administration and AFL-CIO agreed that
the implementation of the 1998 ILO Worker's Rights Declaration will not prevent
them from efforts in other international bodies, such as the WTO, to consider
labor and environmental issues).
203. 128 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) supra note 186; Unions Will Again Urge
Trade Ministers to Create Labor Working Party at WTO, 70 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) A-3 (Apr. 13, 1998).
204. Sweeney, "Remarks" to The New Internationalism Council on Foreign
Relations (visited Apr. 1, 1998) <http://www.aflcio.org/publ /speech98/sp0401.htm>.
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statutes., 20 5 He concluded that "promulgation of labor standards
and social justice must be moved forward consistently and in
compliance with an increase in global trade.,
216
It appears unlikely, therefore, that adoption of the 1998 ILO
Workers' Rights Declaration will entirely preempt other forums
and other supervisory mechanisms from linking workers' rights and
economic policies in the global market. Neither will the Declara-
tion totally remove pressures within the United States to condition
trade benefits on acceptable labor standards and working condi-
tions. The new Declaration is, however, an important means of
encouraging promotion as a substitute for the compulsion of trade
sanctions. 2° If the promotion of new Declaration fails, however,
it will only accelerate the drive for enforceable international labor
standards.
Promoting labor rights is not "just a matter of trying to enforce
human rights simply because it is the right thing to do; it is also an
economic matter. 208 As Vogelson states:
[I]t is in the United States' interest to support a reasonable
effort by the ILO to raise working standards in any trading
country that has significantly lower standards than the United
States has - especially if that country exports its low-labor-cost
goods to the United States. 2°
VII. Conclusion
Economic globalization no longer is confined to a few large
multinational corporations doing business in several host countries.
The 21st century economy is truly a global market in which
communications, transportation, production, marketing, and
distribution are international in reach.
U.S. unions are struggling to keep pace with economic
globalization by promoting workers' rights standards in every forum
where they can gain standing. The ILO is a forum in which the
205. Report of the Committee on the Declaration of Principles, supra note 2,
para. 378. (remarks of U.S. government) <http://www.ilo.org/public/english-
/l0ilc/ilc86/com-decl.htm>.
206. Id.
207. As Vogelson comments:
[S]harp trade sanctions can harm consumers more than they help labor;
they also often lead to retaliation. Voluntary compliance, as in the ILO,
removes suspicions of protectionist intent and thus avoids the risk of
retaliation. Vogelson, supra note 5, at 661.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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AFL-CIO and its union counterparts from across the world have
equal standing to governments and employers.
The 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Workers' Rights is the latest and potentially most effective
mechanism to promote international labor standards. It reestablish-
es the ILO as the preeminent international body for the promulga-
tion, supervision and promotion of international labor standards.
The Declaration reduces pressures on other international bodies,
particularly the WTO, to adopt coercive trade sanctions as the
appropriate means of enhancing workers' rights and improving
working conditions. As such, it is an important accomplishment for
U.S. and world employers.
The Declaration is a significant accomplishment for U.S. and
foreign unions, as well, by providing an important mechanism for
promoting international labor standards and improved working
conditions among U.S. trading partners around the world. At the
same time, the Declaration's follow-up mechanisms may expose the
weaknesses in current U.S. labor laws and labor-management
practices which have prevented the U.S. from ratifying the
fundamental ILO conventions. Consistent with the Declaration's
promotional objectives, the result may be additional pressures on
Congress to reform U.S. labor and employment statutes to conform
to the principles of international standards enunciated in the
Declaration.
Christopher R. Coxson
